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IN TRE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the Estate of ANNA 
L. HARRIS, Deceased, 
ZION'S S_._-\_ \TINGS BANK & TRUST 
COl\IP .... ~NY, a Corporation, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STERLING P. HARRIS, Admini-
strator of the Estate of Anna L. 
Harris, Deceased, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
No. 6238 
The petition filed in the District Court (Abs. 2) 
recites: 
"That at the time of the death of Anna L. 
Harris there was pending in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah a proceed-
ing under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act.'' 
Section 75 subsection (N) of the Bankruptcy Act 
provides: 
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"The filing of a petition or answer with the 
clerk of the court or. leaving it with the concilia-
tion commissioner for the purpose of sending the 
same to the clerk of the court praying for relief 
under this section shall immediately subject the 
farmer and all his property 'vherever located for 
all the purposes of this section to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the court.'' 
And further in proceedings under this section : 
''The courts, the title, powers and duties of 
its officers, etc. ****shall be the same as if a 
voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed 
or a decree of adjudication had been entered on 
the day when the farmers petition asking to be 
adjudged a bankrupt was filed with the clerk of 
the court or left with the conciliation comnlis-
sioner for the purpose of sending the same to the 
clerk of the court.'' 
It will thus be seen that the jurisdiction and control 
over the property existed in 'the federal court at the 
time of death. 
Subsection ( r) of Section 75 provides for the pur-
poses of this section : 
"****The term farmer includes not only an 
individual who is primarily bona fide personally 
engaged in producing products of the soil and 
also **•X<*and includes the personal representative 
of a deceased farmer.'' 
In so far as the jurisdiction of the United States 
District Court existed prior to and at the time of the 
death of Anna L. Harris, the statute last above quoted 
has no application. The jurisdiction of a court over 
property does not cease simply because of the death of 
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the o'Yner. The proeeeding is so far in rem that it 
continues. If that 'Yere not the rule great injustice might 
be done because of proceedings existing in the court 
before the death occurred. 
Counsel exhibits great learning in directing atten-
tion to many federal cases which by no possible stretch 
of the in1agination could have anything to do with this 
appeal. We will therefore pass "\vithout notice his very 
learned discussion. 
General order fifty of the Supreme Court of the 
United States prescribes the method by which a personal 
representative initiates a proceeding, not the method by 
which he continues a proceeding pending at the time 
of the death of the debtor. The order of the District 
Court based upon the application made, allowed either 
the initiation of a new proceeding, or the continuation 
of the proceeding pending at the time of the death of 
the deceased. We consider it good practice to respect 
the comity of courts, and even though no rule of law or 
procedure required it, to present appropriate petitions 
to courts which might be interested in the same property. 
The fact that a petition was presented in this case which 
was unnecessary in order to sustain the jurisdiction of 
the federal court cannot be treated as an admission that 
without it the federal court was lacking in jurisdiction 
to continue the rehabilitation of the debtor's estate begun 
in her lifetime. 
The filing of the petition by Anna L. Harris subjected 
her, ''and all of her property'' to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the court. 'rhe jurisdiction was inpersonom and 
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in rem. Death, of course, terminated jurisdiction over 
the person but did not terminate jurisdiction over the 
property. The federal court did hold that pending the 
appearance of some representative having the right to 
speak. General order 50-9 does not apply to this case. 
Passing all of the discussions in appellant's brief 
foreign to the questions before the court, we come to 
page 19 and there find that counsel has seen fit to rest 
the case upon two district court cases : In re: Buxton, 
14 Fed. Sup. 617 and in re: Reynolds 21 Fed. Sup. 369. 
The first from a district court in Illinois and the second 
from a district court in Oklahoma. Both of these cases 
have been disapproved by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
of the Fifth Circuit in Hines v. Farkas 109 F. (2d) 289 
decided January 22, 1940. The statutes of these states 
are not essentially different from the statutes of Utah. 
We consider it unnecessary to discuss or to quote from 
this case. The reasoning appears to be sound and we 
think the case should be followed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. D. SKEEN and 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Attor·neys for Respondent. 
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State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
Anna L. Harris, Deceased. 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a corpor-
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vs. 
STERLING P. HARRIS, adminis-
trator of the estate of Anna L. 
Harris, deceased, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
6238 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of \ 
Anna L. Harris, Deceased. \ 
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK AND I 
TRUST COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
A ppellarnt, 
vs. 
STERLING P. HARRIS, adminis-
trator of the estate of Anna L. 
Harris, deceased, 
Case No. 
6238 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
1. GENERAL ORD'ER 50(9) 
The administrator argues that no order of the pro-
bate court was necessary to authorize him to resort to 
the bankruptcy court to apply for a revivor of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, claiming that he might have done 
so without. This is indeed a surprising departure of 
thought. Below he petitioned and his counsel argued 
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most strenuously for the order in question. They con-
sidered it necessary then. Their a.pplica tion is conclu-
sive upon that proposition. And it is no less strange to 
find the administrator and his counsel present on this 
appeal resisting a reversal of an order which they now 
characterize a.s unnecessary. If it is unnecessary, why 
do they bother to sustain it~ 
As an alternative, the administrator argues that 
General Order 50(9') applies only to administrators who 
seek to initiate and not to revive a Frazier-Lemke pro-
ceedings (App. Br. 13). This is not so. It applies to both. 
Assuming for argument that a state probate code 
would permit a probate court to authorize its creature, 
the administrator, to enter into bankruptcy, which we 
have shown is not so in Utah, an administrator would 
first have to be authorized by the. probate court to seek a 
revivor in the bankruptcy court for he is only the crea-
ture, no more, of the probate court a.nd his powers would 
not extend to shaking off at will the jurisdiction of his 
creator and submitting the estate to some other court, 
without that creator's consent. And certainly if the pro-
bate court forbade him, he could not enter into bank-
ruptcy whether to institute or to revive a proceeding, 
for not even a probate court is so powerless as to lack 
full control over its own officer and creature, the admin-
istrator. 
All this is upo:Q. considerations only of general la,v. 
Respondent says General 0'rder 50(9') prescribes a meth-
od by which an administrator '' initia,tes'' a proceeding, 
not that by w:hich he revives one (Resp. Br. 3). This is 
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not so. The words "initiate," "institute" or "com-
mence'' do not appear. The word used is "effect." The 
language is only in regard to an administrator who de-
sires to "effect" a composition or extension under Sec-
tion 75. Now an administrator \vho seeks to revive is 
endeavoring no less to ''effect'' an extension than one 
who seeks to initiate a proceedings. The object is the 
same-to ''effect" an extension under Section 75-in 
both instances. 
And in promulgating the Order the Supreme Court 
only recognized the general law-a law of necessity and 
order among courts-that the bankruptcy court should 
be officially apprized by the probate court that the ad-
ministrator (1) was in fact administrator and (2) had 
obtained authority of his creator to go to the bankruptcy 
court. These fundamental and indispensable facts the 
Supreme Court says must appear by the certificate of 
the probate court attached to the administrator's peti-
tion in the bankruptcy court. 
We submit the implications of the Supreme Court 
order are equally applicable in proceedings to initiate 
or to revive and that the order of th·e probate court is 
necessary in either instance both by general law and 
Gene:··al Order 50(9) as well. 
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II. THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURT 
Counsel make much of the fact that the administra-
tor's intestate died while the bankruptcy proceedings 
were pending in federal court and after the jurisdiction 
of that court attached. The implication of their argu-
ment when followed to a conclusion is that the proceed-
ings in the bankruptcy court actually suspended the state 
laws of descent and distribution. For if regardless of 
statutes of descent, an administrator can ~seize upon the 
property of the heirs to whom it otherwise descends by 
state law and by his own whim substitute the administra-
tion of a federal court (admittedly without probate 
powers) for that of a probate court, and withhold it 
from them three years under the Frazier-Lemke mora-
torium, statutes of descent are certainly suspended. 
None of the heirs, not one of them, may want the bank-
ruptcy proceedings instituted, or if already instituted, 
maintained over the property. They all may prefer the 
probate court upon whom the law enjoins that duty to 
administer and distribute it. Bankruptcy, as it is to most 
people, may be most distasteful to them. They may 
desire and have ample means themselves to discharge 
the de.ot upon the property and receive it at once at the 
hands of the probate court-not three years hence. Yet 
these heirs, the owners in law and to whom the property 
descends by state law, cannot prevent a selfish admin-
istrator from resorting to bankruptcy and withholding· 
the property-their own property-from them if he will. 
This is exactly where respondent '-s argument will lead us. 
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But the death of the intestate while the Frazier-
Lemke proceedings pended should not complicate the 
case. The state law of descent attached immediately 
nevertheless. True, the federal court already had juris-
diction of the property. But this court is not trying the 
question: What shall the federal court do now~ That 
question is for that court to determine after this court 
has said the order here was invalid and has set it aside. 
At that time the federal court will be confronted with 
what to do in a case in which the Almighty has deprived 
it of a party and the state law and probate court have 
refused to provide a new one for it. Quite likely the 
federal court will be obliged to dismiss. It could hardly 
do otherwise, being permanently without a party to the 
cause. But that is not for this court. This court is trying 
the questions of state law regarding statutory powers 
of probate courts and administrators. The problem in 
the federal court is one for that court later on. 
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III. THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND BETTER 
RE.ASONE,D CASES ARE AGAINST T'HE 
AD·MINISTRATOR 
By our opening brief we showed that p·robate pro-
ceedings are purely statutory and that the probate court 
and administr~,tor have only those power·s granted by 
the Code. (App. Br. 14-15) in re: Cloward, 95 U. 453, 
82 P. (2d) 336. 
We also cited the only authorities then known to 
us upon the power of the administrator and the probate 
court to submit the real property to a bankruptcy court. 
B1oth held they could not because the real property was 
vested in the heirs. (App. B.r. 19) in re: Buxton, 14 F. 
Supp. 616. In re : Reynolds, 21 F. Supp. 369. 
Thus we showed the administrator was powerles·s 
upon two propositions: (1) Because the Probate Code 
fails to empower him and (2) Because the real property 
involved vested in and belonged to the heirs. 
The administrator has not attempted to answer the 
first proposition. He does! not even discuss it. And 
obviously he cannot, for such a proposition as that pro-
bate courts and. their administrators have only thos·e 
powers· conferred by statute is altogether unanswerable. 
This. court ·.has so held. In re : Cloward 1SUpra. So in 
failing to atterp.pt an answer, the administrator. must be 
held to have conceded this proposition. In fact, in face 
of the Cloward case, he eannot dispute it. And in face of 
this concession all other propositions become unimport-
ant, for to admit the court and its administrator have 
no power under the Code to enter into bankruptcy, leave~s 
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the order to fall of its o''~ weight and it beeon1es vain 
for the administrator to argue any other propositions. 
But he does so neYertheles1s. Hurdling the first and 
certainly the all important question he arrives at the 
second. It is: Can the administrator submit the real 
property to the bankruptcy court when it is not even; his 
to do with but belongs to the heirs under the statutes of 
descent! He cites Hines vs. Farkas, 109 F. (2,d) 289·. 
The case was from Georgia. Apparently the statutes 
were similar to ours. The two decisions referred to by 
us, holding the administrator is powerless over the real 
property for bankruptcy purposes were cited. The 
answer of the court was, ''We do not agree,'' hardly 
more. Significantly, the lower court had followed the 
Buxton and Reynolds cases, their logic being reasonable 
to the mind of that judge, he, too, being of opinion the 
administrator was without power to take the heirs' 
property to a bankruptcy court. The case is binding 
only in the Fifth Circuit. It is not binding upon this 
court. This court is free to follow the weight of authority 
and the better reasoned cases ~nd to interpret the Pro-
bate Code of Utah for itself. Compare the ·full, l~gical 
reasoning and well-considered opinions in the Buxton 
and Reynolds cases with the scant discussion in the Hines 
case. Consider when by the laws of descent property 
vests in heirs whether someone else, the administrator, 
may deprive them of it regardless of state laws of 
descent and state rules of property which are supTeme 
and we submit the answer, immediately apparent, is that 
the admini~strator may not. 
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The reasoning of the two cases relied upon by ap-
pellant is the better and they are· the weight of authority. 
The administrator may not submit the heirs' property 
to the bankruptcy court. 
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I'F. THE ADMINISTRATOR DOES NOT DENY THE 
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PETITION OR THE 
COURT'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
By our opening brief we showed the petition failed 
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
If for no other reason, the order thereon is e~rroneous. 
We refer the reader to our opening brief for this dis-
cussion. (App. B:r. 24). 
We also showed that the court had a duty to appraise 
the situation and was obliged to exHrcise: a sound dis-
cretion in deciding the petition of administrator who 
already for one year in the probate court, and whose 
intestate for another year before him in the bankruptcy 
court, had journeyed without avail and who failed to 
appear here until five days before sheriff's deed, and 
still failed, even by way of allegation, to offer any. solu-
tion. And we demonstrated that upon appraising this 
situation and in considering the time already wasted, 
the total and unexplained inaction of the administrator, 
and finally the utter lack of any suggestion of hope cal-
culated to extricate the estate, the heirs and the mort-
gagee from this predicament a sound discretion should 
have been indulged and should have led the court to deny 
the petition, failing which the court's action constituted 
a thorough abuse of discretion in the circumstances. 
Respondent's brief deals with neither of these pro-
positions, the sufficiency of the petition or the, abuse of 
the court's discretion. He denies neither. Failing to 
controvert them he must concede their correctness. By 
similar quiescence he has conceded, as we have seen, a 
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third proposition entirely devastating to his cause, viz., 
That probate courts and administrators have only those 
powers conferred by the Code and the latter nowhere 
confers the power sought he~re. Thus failing to con-
trovert them the administrator admits three propositions 
we contended for: (1) That he and the probate court 
are under the Code be·reft of the powers claimed, (2) the 
petition lacks facts to state a cause of action, and (3) 
the court abused its discretion in granting the petition. 
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v.... THE POWERS OF THE PROB.ATE COURrr AND 
ITS AD,~IINISTRATOR ARE QUESTIONS OF 
STATE LA\V. THE STAT:E COURT'S D·ETERMIN-
ATION HEREIN WILL BE FINAL AND BIND;S 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT. 
This court need entertain no doubt upon the efficacy 
of its decision to be rendHred here. 
Questions of state law, statutory and otherwise, are 
exclusively for state courts. Their interpretation is bind-
ing on all others. 
Time was until just recently (1938) when federal 
courts were bound as to state law only by positive· state 
statutes on a subject but were otherwise free to apply 
their own reasoning to matters of general or unwritten 
state law even though the result might be exactly oppo-
site to the settled decisions of the highest state court 
upon the subject. This was by rule of the early United 
States Supre!Ille Court decision in 1842 in the famous 
case, Swift vs. Ty~son, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865. And for 
nearly 100 years this rule obtained. But in too many 
instances the decisions of the state and federal courts 
were at war upon substantive questions of unwritten 
state law. Abuses became the rule rather than the ex-
ception. For example, it was even possible for a non-
resident plaintiff to take his case to the highest state 
court and if defeated take a voluntary nonsuit and then 
renew the controversy in the fede,ral court. See Erie 
R. Co. vs. Tompkins (note 9) infra. The injustice and 
confusion resulting from Swift vs. Tyson provoked eon-
tinning agitation against its rule throughout the 96 years 
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of it~s force by many of our country's outstanding lawyers, 
among them Mr. Frankfurter. Frankfurter, Distribu-
tion of Judicial Powers Betwe.en Federal and Stafe 
Courts ( 19'28) 13 Cornell L. Q. 499'. See Erie R. Co. v-s. 
Tompkins (note 6) infra. 
The ag~tation against the injustice and confusion 
resulting from Swift vs·. Tyson did not attain fruition 
until two years ago (1938) when the Supreme Court 
finally and expressly overruled that case and adopted 
the more sensible and ju!st rule· that questions of state 
law unwritten as well as written are exclusively for 
state courts and the fede.ral courts are bound by and 
must follow their interpretation. Erie R. Co. vs. Tomp-
kins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817. It was said by way of 
introduction: 
''The question for decision is whether the oft-
challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now 
be disapproved. '' 
And after an historical discussion of Swift vs. Tyson 
the confusion and injustice incident to its doctrine and 
the necessity for its overruling, the court squarely over-
ruled it and said: 
''Except in matters governed by the Feder-
al Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law 
to be applied in any case is the law of the state. 
And whether the law of the state shall be declared 
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest 
court in a decision is not a matter of ff?deral 
conc-ern.'' (Italics added) 
The effect of this· new and just doctrine binding fed-
eral courts to state- court interpretation of state law rus 
applied to bankruptcy is now revealed in the very recent 
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case (March 25, 1940) which followed the Tompkins case, 
viz., Thompson Ys. Magnolia Petroleum Company. 60 
S. Ct. 628. (Adv. Sheet No. 11, April 15, 1940). Two 
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal had reached opposite 
conclusions upon the effect of old right of way deeds to 
railroad companie·s of Illinois lands· overlying a rich oil 
field discoYered in 1938. Whether these documents con-
veyed a fee with the consequent right to drill for and 
.. 
capture the underlying· oil or simply an easement for 
road-bed purposes \Yas the question. No applicable state 
cottrt decision upon the subject had ever been rendered. 
Should the federal court let the railroad's trustee in 
bankruptcy be heard in the bankruptcy court about a 
matter of state law as yet wholly undetennined by the 
highest court of lllinois and be put to the risk of gue·ssing 
in advance what the state court might later hold to be 
the law~ Or should the trustee in bankruptcy be remitted 
to an action as plaintiff in the state court where the 
question would be authorita~ively and conclusively de-
cided~ The answer was obvious. At least to the United 
States Supreme Court it was obvious. It :said: 
"Decision with which the federal court of 
bankruptcy is here faced calls for interpretation 
of instruments of conveyance in accordance with 
Illinois law. Neither statutes nor decisions of 
Illinois have been nointed to which are clearly 
applicable. And the difficulties of determining 
just what should be the decision under the law 
of that State are persuasively indicated by the 
different results reached by the two Circuit 
Courts of Appeal that have attempted the de-
termination. Unless the matter is referred to the 
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State courts, upon subsequent decision by the 
Supreme Court of Illinois it may appear that 
, rights in local property of parties to this pro-
ceeding have-by the accident of federal jurisdic-
tion-been determined contrary to the law of the 
State which in such matters is supreme.'' (Italics 
added) Thompson vs. Magnolia Petroleum Com-
pany supra. 
And so the Supreme Court ordered the trustee in 
bankruptcy to prosecute the case in the state court of 
Illinois. The reason being that the law of the state as 
interpreted by the state court would be supreme. The 
doctrine of Erie R. Co. vs. Tompkins supra is thus logic-
ally projeeted into bankruptcy matters. Thus federal 
courts in bankruptcy are bound by the state law as 
interpreted by the state courts no less than they are in 
civil cases. The federal court of bankruptcy in the matter 
of this administrator's attempt to revive the Frazier-
Lemke proceedings in question will be bound by this 
court's decision here. When this court decides, as we 
confidently assert it will and must under our state pro-
bate statutes, that an administrator is powerless and a 
p:r:obate court is bereft of authority to empower him to 
enter into or revive a bankruptcy, the question will be 
authoritatively concluded once and for all by the highe:st 
court of the land empowered to deal with it. The federal 
court of Utah and all others will then be bound. None 
may dispute it. 
And so we say again this court need entertain no 
doubt upon the efficacy of its decision to be rendered 
here. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Again, as in our opening brief, we say whether an 
administrator who is a statutory creature should be em-
powered to resort to bankruptcy is a question exclusively 
for the state legislature. It has not yet ordained that 
he may. If it be intended that he shall, that body must 
:first say so. The courts may not introduce the abs.ent 
power into the statute. 
Moreover, the realty having devolved upon the heirs, 
the administrator's limited powers by the weight of 
authority and the better reasoned cases do not admit of 
his subjecting it to a bankruptcy court. 
Furthermore, the petition lacks facts to state a caus.e 
of action and the court abused its dis.cretion in granting 
the order and the same must he reversed with costs . 
Dated May 20, 1940. 
. THOMAS & THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Ap~pellant 
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